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Inflation Targeting and Economic 
Performance: The Case of Mexico 
 
Summary: In the paper we analyze the impact of Inflation Targeting (IT) in
Mexico. The objective is to evaluate the impact of the implementation of infla-
tion targeting and full-fledged inflation targeting (FFIT) on the level and the 
variability of the inflation and the output in the Mexican economy. We conclude
that inflation rates had been reduced in Mexico before the introduction of IT
and FFIT. In our opinion, the structural reforms, including the Banxico reforms, 
are the main determinants of the decrease in inflation and its variability. The
main impact of IT would have been the lock-in of inflation expectations around 
a low rate of inflation.
Key words: Inflation, Mexico, Inflation targeting.
JEL: E31, E52, E58, N16.
 
 
 
 
 
Since its introduction in 1990 in New Zealand, Inflation Targeting (IT) has been 
gradually implemented worldwide, becoming the dominant monetary policy strategy. 
Although at a first stage IT was implemented in developed economies (Ben S. Ber-
nanke et al. 1999), this monetary strategy expanded to an increasing number of de-
veloping economies. These economies adopted IT as a result of the failure of pegged 
exchange rates to permanently reduce inflation rates, mainly because of the impossi-
bility to maintain a stable exchange rate (Bernanke et al. 1999; Frederic S. Mishkin 
2000; International Monetary Fund - IMF 2005; Charles Freedman and Inci Ötker-
Robe 2009; Scott Roger 2009). The significant reduction of the level and variability 
of inflation in developing and developed economies and the high output stability 
would be the proof of the effectiveness of this monetary strategy (Bernanke et al. 
1999; Mark R. Stone and Ashok J. Bhundia 2004; IMF 2005; Mishkin and Klaus 
Schmidt-Hebbel 2007; Carlos E. Gonçalves and Joao M. Salles 2008; Roger 2009). 
However, the theoretical and empirical evaluation of the performance of the IT 
monetary framework is controversial. A first set of criticisms is related to the ability 
of IT to stabilize simultaneously the output and the inflation, and to meet other objec-
tives like low unemployment rates or high rates of economic growth (Ricardo D. 
Brito and Brianne Bystedt 2010). A second group of criticisms focuses on the capac-
ity of IT to generate and maintain low inflation rates (Joseph E. Stiglitz 2008). A 
third set of criticisms relates to the inability of IT to fight asset bubbles (Jeffrey A. 
Frankel 2009; Philip Arestis 2009). Finally, other criticisms argue that the results 
obtained by inflation-targeters are not significantly different from those non-inflation  
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targeters (Laurence Ball and Niamh Sheridan 2005), in particular the countries with 
pegged exchange rate regimes (Atish R. Ghosh and Jonathan D. Ostry 2009). 
A number of papers argue that the performance of inflation targeters in terms 
of the price level stability is not significantly different from that achieved by coun-
tries with other monetary strategies (Alvaro Angeriz and Arestis 2007a, 2007b, 2008; 
John McDermott and Peter McMenamin 2008; Carlos Capistrán and Manuel Ramos-
Francia 2009). For these studies, the low and stable inflation rates registered during 
the “Great Moderation” are explained by a combination of international factors, like 
the process of globalization and the stronger immersion in the world economy of de-
veloping countries like China and India (IMF 2005; Angeriz and Arestis 2008). At 
most, IT would have contributed to anchor expectations around a low inflation rate 
achieved before IT implementation (Refet S. Gürkaynak, Andrew T. Levin, and Eric 
T. Swanson 2006; Gürkaynak et al. 2007; Capistrán and Ramos-Francia 2010). 
Moreover, non-targeters recently have also seen their inflation expectations anchored 
at lower levels than in the past. Efrem Castelnuovo, Sergio Nicolerri-Altimari, and 
Diego Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2003), Ball and Sheridan (2005), and Angeriz and Ar-
estis (2008) argue that the lock-in effect is similar in both groups of economies. In 
the words of the current Governor of the Bank of England (Mervyn King 2009): “In-
flation targeting is a necessary but not sufficient condition for stability in the econ-
omy as a whole.” 
In addition, other authors argue that IT effects on inflation would not be ex-
plained by the own strategy but by some of their features, like transparency and ac-
countability, the increased autonomy granted to the central banks, and the restrictions 
to finance public budgets (Marco Arnone et al. 2007; Carl E. Walsh 2007; Alex Cuk-
ierman 2008). IT effectiveness would be a function of a set of preconditions: institu-
tional independence, a well-developed technical infrastructure, economic structure 
and a healthy financial system (IMF 2005). In this sense, although some authors ar-
gue that the success do not depend on these preconditions, they also argue that suc-
cess depends on the policy-makers’ commitment and ability to apply institutional 
reforms once the IT has been implemented (Nicoletta Batini and Douglas Laxton 
2007). In sum, the better performance of price stability would be the result of the 
existence of these preconditions and/or the existence of a proper political-
institutional framework and not of the implementation of IT.  
In the case of emerging market and developing countries, there are additional 
criticisms to the effectiveness of IT. Some papers conclude that, although IT gener-
ates good outcomes in developed economies, the performance in developing and 
emerging market countries is not clear (Brito and Bystedt 2010; Irineu E. de Car-
vallho Filho 2010). In the case of Latin America countries, although papers like 
Schmidt-Hebbel and Alejandro Werner (2002), Carmen Broto (2008), and McDer-
mott and McMenamin (2008), conclude that IT has succeeded in reducing inflation, 
other studies question the role of IT as a major determinant of the inflation reduction 
recorded in the nineties. These papers argue that the implementation of IT was pre-
ceded and accompanied by Central Bank independence and for a set of structural 
reforms that changed the way of conducting the macroeconomic policy. They con-
clude that, once that control for the structural reforms and policies is undertaken, the  
677  Inflation Targeting and Economic Performance: The Case of Mexico 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 5,  Special Issue, pp. 675-692
impact of IT on inflation significantly diminishes (Freedman and Douglas Laxton 
2009). Thus, for example, although Gonçalves and Salles (2008) argue that the im-
plementation of IT had a significant effect on inflation in developing countries, it 
would only explain between 17.5% and 22.2% of the total inflation decrease in 13 
developing economies that implemented this strategy. In a paper that studies the im-
pact on inflation of the independence of central banks, Luis I. Jácome and Francisco 
Vazquez (2008) conclude that the impact of structural reforms is 10 times higher 
than the impact of the central bank independence. 
Brito and Bystedt (2010) conclude, analyzing 46 developing countries, that the 
impact of IT on inflation is limited and not significant. Moreover, IT has a negative 
effect on output growth, thus doubting the effectiveness of this monetary strategy. 
Focusing on the Mexican case, some papers (Luis M. Galindo and Jaime Ros 2006, 
2008; Victor M. Cuevas Ahumada 2008; Carlos A. Ibarra 2008; Eduardo Loria 2009; 
Guadalupe Mantey de Anguiano 2009) argue that the implementation of IT in Mex-
ico may have negatively affected economic growth through its impact on the appre-
ciation of the real exchange rate (Arestis 2009). Nelson H. Barbosa-Filho (2008) and 
Gerald Epstein and Erinc Yeldan (2008) reach a similar conclusion for Brazil and for 
a sample of developed and developing economies, respectively. Actually, defenders 
of IT emphasize the key role played by the exchange rate in IT emerging market 
economies (Mishkin 2000), and, in a recent paper, Osvaldo Kacef and Rafael López-
Monti (2010) show that in some Latin American targeters, concerns about the real 
exchange rate have led central banks to intervene in the currency markets. 
The above analysis shows that the conclusions about the impact of IT are not 
conclusive and generalized. This leads to the need for particular studies on concrete 
cases to assess the IT effectiveness in each country. The aim of this paper is to ana-
lyze whether the implementation of IT in Mexico had a significant effect on inflation, 
or whether the inflation performance of this country is mainly related to other factors, 
such as increased Central Bank autonomy or the structural reforms. Full-Fledged 
Inflation Targeting
1 in Mexico was preceded by a change in the monetary strategy, 
firstly by the reform in 1993 of Banco de Mexico’s Act increasing its autonomy, and, 
secondly, by adopting IT in 1999 as its monetary strategy. 
The analysis of the Mexican case can shed light on the debates on the reasons 
of the generalized disinflation process registered in advanced and emerging and de-
veloping economies, and on the role placed by IT in this process. 
Moreover, the analysis contributes to distinguish the impact of the implemen-
tation in 2001 of FFIT from the effects of the earlier implementation of IT in 1999. 
By proceeding this way, we can asses the impact generated by the change in the 
strategy of monetary policy. With the implementation of the FFIT in 2001, Banxico 
set the inflation target on 3% (with a margin of ±1%). Thus, we can know whether 
                                                        
1 Alina Carare and Stone (2003) propose a classification for countries adopting IT with three regimes 
according to their credibility and commitment, FFIT: countries with a high commitment controlling infla-
tion, and medium and high levels of credibility; Eclectic Inflation Targeting (EIT): countries with high 
credibility allowing them to maintain low and stable inflation without a high level of transparency and 
accountability; Inflation Targeting Lite (Lite IT): characterized by low levels of credibility and clarity, as 
well as having high flexibility in achieving other goals.  
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the effects of IT in Mexico come from the permanent setting of an inflation target or 
from the institutional (central bank independence) and policy (inflation as priority 
objective of monetary policy) framework conforming the IT monetary strategy. 
Our objective is to test whether the implementation of IT (in 1999) and/or 
FFIT (in 2001) have influenced inflation performance in Mexico.  
The paper structures as follows. First, we make a short description of the main 
features of the implementation of the inflation targeting in Mexico. Second, we 
model inflation outcomes in Mexico following the methodology proposed by George 
E. P. Box and Gwilym Jenkins (1976) for univariate series and Box and George C. 
Tiao (1975) for intervention analysis, which allows to analyze the impact of the im-
plementation of IT and FFIT monetary strategies. Third section compares the infla-
tion performance in Mexico and the United States, both in terms of the levels and 
variability of inflation rates. We also check whether IT has affected the performance 
in terms of the Mexican economic growth. The final section summarizes and con-
cludes. The evidence shows that the introduction of FFIT occurred in a context of 
stabilized inflation and the key change came from the changes in Banco de Mexico’s 
laws with IT serving as nominal anchor once inflation was reduced. 
 
1. The Implementation of Inflation Targeting Monetary 
Strategy in Mexico 
 
Recent Mexican economic history can be classified into two periods according to the 
growth strategy implemented. The first period corresponds to the implementation of 
the “imports substitution industrialization”, which started with the administration of 
the President Lázaro Cárdenas in 1936 and ended at the beginning of the 1980s with 
the debt crisis and the private bank expropriation. In this strategy, the public sector 
was at the core of the whole economic process, driving the economic development 
and growth process. This growth strategy finished in the early eighties with the fall 
of international oil prices and the debt crisis. Forced by the debt crisis and the con-
traction of the credit, Mexico adopted a new exports-led growth strategy. 
The process of structural adjustment began with the administration of the 
President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado. However, some of the most significant 
changes were made during the administration of the President Carlos Salinas de Gor-
tari. Among these changes, in 1993 the Act of Banco de México (Banxico) and the 
Constitutional Article 28 of the Mexican Constitution were reformed in order to give 
higher autonomy to Banxico, and price stability was established as the main objec-
tive of the Mexican Central Bank. Thus, the amended article 28 of the Mexican Con-
stitution limited government funding by Banxico, and gave higher autonomy to 
Banxico from politicians. Moreover, the Act of Banco de México was also amended. 
Article 2 of the Act set price stability as the main goal of Banxico. Article 38 estab-
lished that the Board of Governors of Banxico was formed by five members: the 
Governor and four sub-governors. Article 40 set out the mandates of each member of 
the governing board, dissociating the mandates of the members of the Board of Gov-
ernors from the electoral calendar. According to the article 40 of the Banco de Mex-
ico Law: “The Governor will be appointed for a term of six years and Deputy Gov- 
679  Inflation Targeting and Economic Performance: The Case of Mexico 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 5,  Special Issue, pp. 675-692
ernors for eight years. The term of the Governor will start on the first of January of 
the fourth year of the President of the Republic’s term. The terms of the Deputy Gov-
ernors will be staggered, with one starting every other year on the first of January of 
the first, third and fifth years of the President’s term. The individuals occupying 
these posts may be appointed members of the Board of Governors for more than one 
term.” In addition, like in article 28 of Mexican Constitution, it was also approved 
that the President of Mexico made the appointment of the members, but that this ap-
pointment had to be ratified by the Mexican Senate. 
 
Table 1 Inflation Outcomes and Targets (1995-2008) 
 
Year  Actual inflation  Inflation target 
1995 51.97%  42.0% 
1996 27.70%  20.5% 
1997 15.72%  15.0% 
1998 18.61%  12.0% 
1999 12.32%  13.0% 
2000 8.96%  10.0% 
2001 4.40% 6.5% 
2002 5.70% 4.5% 
2003 3.98%  3%  (±1%) 
2004 5.19%  3%  (±1%) 
2005 3.33%  3%  (±1%) 
2006 4.05%  3%  (±1%) 
2007 3.76%  3%  (±1%) 
2008 6.53%  3%  (±1%) 
 
Source: Banco de México and Banco de Información Económica, INEGI, Mexico (1995-2008). 
 
The independence of the Banco of Mexico and the priority given to price sta-
bility as the main objective of the monetary policy paved the way for a later imple-
mentation of the inflation targeting, which took place in 1999. FFIT monetary strat-
egy was adopted two years later in 2001. Whilst in 1999 and 2000 the Banco of Mex-
ico set the inflation targets on an annual basis, the implementation of the FFIT made 
that the Banco of Mexico set the target of inflation rate at 3% (within a range of 
±1%). In the transition to this long-term objective, the Banco of Mexico also set the 
targets for the years 2001 (6.5%) and 2002 (4.5%). Table 1 shows the evolution since 
1995 of the inflation rates and the inflation targets. 
 
2. Modelling Inflation Performance in Mexico 
 
In this section we will use monthly data of inflation since 1993:01 to 2009:09 to 
evaluate the introduction of IT and FFIT. The use of monthly data allows a more pre-
cise analysis of the impact of the implementation of IT and FFIT on Mexican infla-
tion. Moreover, by using monthly data we can know better the impact of inflation of 
the peso crisis happened in early 1995. 
Although there are available data of monthly inflation since 1970 (see Figure 
3), our analysis starts in 1993. The reason is that we want to control for the influence 
of current economic activity on inflation, that is, we want to control that part of the  
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inflation rates that have a cyclical nature related to the business cycle. Since we are 
using monthly date of inflation we should also use monthly data of GDP. Since these 
data are not available, we have substituted GDP values by one proxy that measures 
on a monthly basis the level of economic activity: the General Index of Economic 
Activity (IGAE). 
Figure 1 shows the series of annual and monthly (Figure 1a and 1b, respec-
tively) inflation rates in Mexico. The highest figures are registered during the 1995 
crisis. Since then, we observe a strong disinflationary process during the period 
1996-2000. The figures of monthly inflation show that the instability after the crisis 
boils down to the end of 1998, the beginning of the transition to FFIT. Since the im-
plementation of FFIT in 2001 the inflation rates stabilize around a low rate close to 
the target of inflation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BIE-INEGI.
 
Figure 1  Annual and Monthly Inflation in Mexico (1994:01-2009:09) 
 
Figure 2a presents an upward trend of Consumer Price Index (INPC). Figure 
2b shows the logarithms of the INPC, also showing an increasing trend (logarithms 
are used henceforth). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BIE-INEGI.
 
Figure 2  Evolution of the Consumer Price Index 
 
For the ARIMA analysis we need to know the integration order of the vari-
ables. Looking at the figures, we observe that the series of Log(INPC) is not station-
ary. We apply unit root tests to Log(INPC) and Log(IGAE). The tests used are Aug- 
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mented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS). ADF and PP have as null hypothesis the presence of unit root 
while KPSS has as null hypothesis that the tested series is stationary. Results of these 
tests are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Testing Unit Root in Log(INPC) and Log(IGAE) (1993:01-  2009:09) 
 
Log(INPC) 
 Levels  Prob.  1st difference p-value 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)  -1.406  0.856  -4.649  0.001 
Phillips-Perron  (PP)  -0.936 0.949 -4.446 0.002 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS)  0.412  0.146* 0.112 0.146* 
Log(IGAE) 
 Levels  Prob.  1st difference p-value 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)  -2.7383  0.223  -2.6567  0.256 
Phillips-Perron (PP)  -5.0310  0.000  -41.553  0.000 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) 0.1499  0.146*  0.099  0.146* 
 
Notes: * asymptotic critical values for the KPSS test at 5% level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
For Log(INPC) the ADF and PP tests do not reject the null hypothesis of unit 
root at levels, and KPSS test does reject the null hypothesis of a stationary series. 
The tests applied to first level differences indicate the absence of unit root, that is, 
Log(INPC) is integrated of first order [Log(INPC)~I(1)]. In the case of Log(IGAE), 
the ADF and PP tests reach opposite results: ADF for levels and for first differences 
indicates the existence of unit root, but the PP tests show the absence of unit root. In 
this case, and with the aim to use IGAE as control variable, we use the KPSS tests 
and the correlograms to know the order of the series. According to both proofs, 
Log(IGAE) is integrated of order 1, that is, Log(IGAE)~I(1). 
Once we know that Log(INPC)~I(1) and Log(IGAE)~I(1), it is possible to ob-
serve the AC and PAC for the Log(INPC) and propose an ARIMA model: 
Log(INPC)~(1,1,0)(12,0,0)S with d(Log(IGAE),1) as control variable. 
We estimate the parameters considering: 
 
Log(INPC)~ARIMA(1,1,0)(12,0,0)s  (1)
 
During the period observed, the Mexican economy experienced a strong crisis 
in 1995. Because of the Tequila crisis, we introduce a dummy variable (D1) to con-
trol the impact of this crisis: 
 


 
Otherwise
D
~ 0
05 : 1995 01 : 1995 ~ 1
1   (2)
 
We also use two types of impulse dummies (D2 and D3), as intervention 
analysis, looking for the effect of the introduction of IT (D2) and FFIT (D3):       
                                                               



Otherwise
D
~ 0
12 : 1998 ~ 1
2   (3)
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


Otherwise
D
~ 0
01 : 2001 ~ 1
3   (4)
 
In sum, we estimate the following model: 
 
t t s
t t t s
L L
Z INPC Log
   
  
) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
) (
12
2 1
1 0
    
       (5)
 
Where Zt is a vector of exogenous variables including t s IGAE Log ) (
1 0  , 
D1, D2 and D3. Therefore, our model assumes that the Mexican inflation depends on 
the level of economic activity (proxied by IGAE), and that this relationship has been 
influenced by the shock of the Tequila crisis and by changes in the monetary policy 
strategy (proxied by the implementation of the IT and FFIT strategies). The results 
are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 Results of the Estimation (1993:01-2009:09) 
 
Dependent variable: 
t
1 0
s Log(INPC) Δ Δ
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 0.008***  0.008***  0.008***  0.008*** 
D1  0.021*** 0.0210*** 0.021***  0.021*** 
D2 0.005 0.005 
D3     -0.003  -0.003 
ΔLog(IGAE) -0.024***  -0.024***  -0.023***  -0.024*** 
AR(1) 0.772***  0.771***  0.771***  0.770*** 
SAR(12) 0.350***  0.356***  0.3641***  0.370*** 
R2 0.808  0.810  0.809  0.811 
Adjusted R2 0.803  0.805  0.804  0.805 
F-stat 191.195***  154.284***  153.178***  128.782*** 
DW 2.143  2.159  2.149  2.165 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)  -7.940  -7.941  -7.935  -7.936 
Schwarz Criterion (BIC)  -7.854  -7.837  -7.831  -7.815 
ADF (for residuals)  -14.623***  -14.739*** -14.663*** -14.781*** 
Phillips-Perron test (for residuals) -14.623*** -14.738*** -14.663*** -14.780*** 
Q(12): Ljung-Box statistics at lag 12  9.453  9.698  9.837  10.216 
Jarque-Bera 770.099***  802.251***  797.490***  832.030*** 
 
Notes: *** null hypothesis rejected at 1%; ** null hypothesis rejected at 5%; * null hypothesis rejected at 10%. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Coefficients D1, AR (1), SAR (12) and  t s IGAE Log ) (
1 0   are statistically 
significant in all the models. D2 and D3 are not statistically significant in any model, 
and, consequently, the introduction of IT and FFIT in Mexico did not significantly 
affect the inflation trend. DW statistic rejects the null hypothesis of serial autocorre- 
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lation. The residuals of all the models do not present unit root according to ADF and 
PP tests. The Jarque-Bera normality test rejects the null hypothesis of normality in 
residuals. In a recent paper, Miguel A. Díaz Carreño and Reyna Vergara González 
(2009) find that normality is presented in the inflation rate in the period 2000-2007: 
they show the presence of a normal distribution on the Mexican rate of inflation dur-
ing the period 2000-07, finding that in this period inflation would converge to a rate 
within a range (4.1%-5.6%) higher than the inflation target set by the Banco of Mex-
ico. Nonetheless, the shocks of the debt crisis, via the inflationary impact of the peso 
devaluation, and the adjustment policy in 1980s and the tequila crisis in 1990s affect 
the behavior of the trend before the referred period
2. 
In sum, the above analysis shows that the introduction of IT and FFIT did not 
significantly affected the inflation performance in Mexico. However, although we 
cannot argue that the introduction of IT affected inflation performance, since 2000 
the inflation rates have remained at unprecedented low level below or close to the 
upper limit of the target range (i.e., 4%). Therefore, the above conclusion does not 
deny the possibility that IT has anchored the inflation expectations close to the infla-
tion target. 
 
 
Source: INEGI.
 
Figure 3  Annual Rates of Inflation 1970:1-2010:3 
 
As argued in the first section, one of the advantages of IT would be that, by 
anchoring inflation expectations around the inflation target, the volatility of inflation 
would fall. As Figure 3 shows, since 2000 Mexico has recorded an unparalleled pe-
riod of low (below 10%) and stable inflation. Thus, during the period 1970:1-
1999:12 the average annual inflation rate was 35.03%, with a standard deviation of 
35.38. However, in the period 2000.1-2010:3, the average annual inflation rate fell to 
5.21% with a standard deviation of 1.73: inflation is not only lower but also signifi-
cantly more stable than in the past. 
                                                        
2 Moreover, even when the JB does reject the null hypothesis of normality, according to Greta M. Ljung 
and George E. P. Box (1978, p. 302): “Circumstances occur where this assumption is not true (normality 
in the residuals)… Results by Anderson and Walker (1964) show that the asymptotic normality of the rk’s 
does not require normality of the at’s only that var(at) is finite.” 
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As we have done for the level of inflation rates, in the next section we will 
analyze if the introduction of IT and FFIT explain the higher inflation stability regis-
tered in the last decade in Mexico. This is a relevant matter, since, in many respects, 
the effectiveness of the IT monetary strategy should be evaluated in terms not of its 
ability to reduce inflation rates to low levels, but, mainly, in terms of its ability to 
stabilize inflation once that low inflations rates have been achieved. Actually, Mish-
kin (2000) and Paul R. Masson, Miguel Savastano, and Sunil Sharma (1997) argue 
that in the case of emerging and developing economies with a record of high inflation 
rates, IT is an effective monetary strategy only when a successful disinflation has 
happened before the implementation of the IT. If we accept this hypothesis, IT and 
FFIT in Mexico should be evaluated not in terms of their capacity to reduce inflation 
rates but in terms of their capacity to keep and stabilize inflation performance at a 
low rate. 
 
3. Has the Implementation of IT Stabilized Mexican Inflation? 
 
In this section, the objective is to analyze whether the implementation of the inflation 
targeting strategy has helped to stabilize the Mexican inflation. With this aim, we 
will apply a number of statistical tests to the inflation performance in Mexico. We 
will also compare the performance of inflation in Mexico with that of the United 
States (USA), the Mexico’s main trading partner. 
To make this analysis, we have extracted inflation trends using a Hodrick-
Prescott filter. Figure 4 shows the trends in annual inflation rates in Mexico and the 
United States during the period 1970:01 to 2009:01. Since the early 1970s until the 
late nineties, the inflation trend in Mexico has been much higher than that observed 
in United States. However, since 2000 a clear convergence in Mexican inflation trend 
to that of the USA is detected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BIE-INEGI (2010); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010).
 
Figure 4  Trends of Annual Inflation Rates in Mexico and USA (1970-2008) 
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Table 4 divides the whole period analyzed into 5 sub-periods (1970:02-
1980:12, 1981:01-1990:12, 1991:01-1998:12, 1999:01-2009:01, 1970:02-2009:01), 
and gives the mean and standard deviation of monthly inflation rates of United States 
and Mexico. Tests of equality of means (ANOVA F-statistic) and variances (F-test) 
are also used. The period 1999:01-2009:1 shows the behavior of inflation in both 
economies during the working of IT in Mexico. 
Average inflation in Mexico is higher and statistically different in all periods. 
The variance is different in the periods 1970:02-1980:12, 1981:01-1990:12, 1991:01-
1998:12 and in 1970:02-2009:01 (for the full sample). However, in the period under 
the IT strategy (1999:01-2009:01) not only the standard deviation of Mexican infla-
tion is lower than in the USA, but also the F-test does not reject the null hypothesis 
of equal variances. Therefore, in that period the volatility of Mexican inflation during 
the IT period is statistically similar to that registered in the USA economy. As data 
show, the sizes of the standard deviation and the mean are directly related. Coeffi-
cient of variation (standard deviation divided by the mean) helps to offset this bias. 
Since 1999 the coefficients of variation of Mexican and USA inflation are 0.830 and 
2.095, respectively, thus showing a more stable behaviour of Mexican inflation (al-
though at a higher level than in the USA). This outcome would support the argument 
that IT has helped to reduce the inflation volatility in Mexico. 
 
Table 4   Tests of Mean and Variance Equality of the Monthly Inflation in Mexico and United States 
(1970:02-2009:01) 
 
1970:02-1980:12 
 Mean  Standard  deviation 
ANOVA
F- statistic  Prob. F-Test Prob. 
Mexico 0.013  0.010 
49.418 0.000  7.031  0.000  USA 0.006  0.004 
1981:01-1990:12 
 Mean  Standard  deviation 
ANOVA 
F- statistic  Prob. F-Test Prob. 
Mexico 0.042  0.026 
248.902 0.000  83.227  0.000  USA 0.004  0.003 
1991:01-1998:12 
 Mean  Standard  deviation 
ANOVA
F- statistic  Prob. F-Test Prob. 
Mexico 0.015 0.012
110.561 0.000  59.692  0.000  USA 0.002 0.001
1999:01-2009:01 
 Mean  Standard  deviation 
ANOVA
F- statistic  Prob. F-Test Prob. 
Mexico 0.005  0.004 
23.650 0.000  1.280  0.178  USA 0.002  0.004 
1970:02-2009:01 
 Mean  Standard  deviation 
ANOVA
F- statistic  Prob. F-Test Prob. 
Mexico 0.018 0.021
227.567 0.000  30.666  0.000  USA 0.004 0.004
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
686  Carlos A. Carrasco and Jesús Ferreiro 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 5,  Special Issue, pp. 675-692 
However, the more stable performance of inflation in Mexico during the IT 
period may be due to a previous convergence in the Mexican and USA inflation vola-
tility. To find the date when the null hypotheses of equality of means and/or variance 
are/is not rejected, we have applied the mean and variance equality tests in an itera-
tive way to the monthly inflation rates in Mexico and the USA. Table 5 shows the 
results. The null hypothesis of equality of means is rejected for all the periods tested 
but null hypothesis of equality of variance is not rejected since July 1997 onwards. 
This date is well before the introduction of IT in 1999. Therefore, the volatility of 
Mexican inflation rates fell before the IT implementation. This conclusion agrees 
with the papers by Angeriz and Arestis (2007a, 2007b, 2008), and McDermott and 
McMenamin (2008), which conclude that inflation level and volatility is reduced 
before IT in some assessed countries (IT Lite countries, UK, OCDE and some Latin 
American countries, respectively). 
To summarize, our results show that the reduction both in the level and the 
volatility of Mexican inflation was achieved before the introduction of the inflation 
targeting monetary strategy. Although IT is not the main determinant of the im-
provement in the inflation performance in Mexico, this does not mean that it has not 
had any impact on inflation. The data show the long lasting of the current phase of 
low and stable inflation. IT may well have contributed to lock-in these results by an-
choring the expectations to this new environment of low inflation. Nonetheless, test-
ing this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Table 5 Convergence in Variability in Mexican and U.S. Inflation 
 
  ANOVA F- statistic  Prob.  F-Test  Prob. 
1998:12-2009:01  25.191  0.000 1.062 0.742 
1998:11-2009:01  26.895  0.000 1.010 0.958 
1998:10-2009:01  28.193  0.000 1.047 0.800 
1998:09-2009:01  29.758  0.000 1.099 0.599 
1998:08-2009:01  30.946  0.000 1.108 0.568 
1998:07-2009:01  32.158  0.000 1.116 0.539 
1998:06-2009:01  33.584  0.000 1.134 0.479 
1998:05-2009:01  34.545  0.000 1.137 0.467 
1998:04-2009:01  35.684  0.000 1.144 0.444 
1998:03-2009:01  37.060  0.000 1.162 0.393 
1998:02-2009:01  38.658  0.000 1.224 0.248 
1998:01-2009:01  40.1210  0.000 1.336 0.097 
1997:12-2009:01  42.143  0.000 1.360 0.077 
1997:11-2009:01  43.926  0.000 1.369 0.070 
1997:10-2009:01  44.864  0.000 1.371 0.068 
1997:09-2009:01  46.284  0.000 1.390 0.056 
1997:08-2009:01  47.481  0.000 1.394 0.052 
1997:07-2009:02  48.780  0.000 1.398 0.050 
1997:06-2009:03  50.117  0.000 1.402 0.047 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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4. Has the Implementation of IT Affected the Mexican Economic 
Growth? 
 
Defenders of the IT monetary strategy argue that IT contributes to a better macro-
economic performance in terms of price and output stability. By anchoring inflation 
expectations to the inflation target, the output stabilizes around its potential level, 
that is, the stability of inflation rates also leads to the stability of the output, reducing 
the volatility of the output gap. By itself, in this framework, inflation targeting does 
not affect the path of economic growth. However, if, like IT defenders argue, high 
and volatile inflation rates have a negative impact on output, the better inflation per-
formance may have a positive impact on the economic activity, raising the rates of 
economic growth and reducing their volatility. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (2009).
 
Figure 5  Annual Rate of Growth of Mexican GDP (%) 
 
Figure 5 shows the annual rates of economic growth in Mexico during the last 
six decades. The only clear conclusion we can get from the observation of these data 
is that since 1980 the economic growth is lower than in the sixties and the seventies, 
but it is difficult to say anything about the behavior in the more recent decades, and, 
consequently, about the impact of IT on the Mexican output. 
To analyze whether IT and FFIT have affected the output growth and its vola-
tility we have analyzed the economic growth in Mexico in the period 1981-2007 us-
ing statistical tests of equality of means and variances. We have used annualized data 
of quarterly GDP growth dates, splitting the whole period in 3 sub-periods, with the 
last sub-period (1999-2007) collecting the data corresponding to the implementation 
of the IT. Table 6 shows the results of this analysis. 
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Table 6 Tests of Mean and Variance Equality on Mexican GDP (1981-2007) 
 
Period Mean  Standard  
deviation 
ANOVA F- statistic 
(regarding the entire period)  Prob. 
F-Test 
(regarding the  
entire period) 
Prob. 
1981:01-1990:04 1.912 5.981  0.554  0.457  1.187  0.550 
1991:01-1998:04 3.075 6.733  0.331  0.740  1.504  0.192 
1999:01-2007:04 3.205 3.315  0.284  0.594  2.740  0.000 
1981:01-2007:04 2.687 5.489         
 
Source: Our calculations based on Centro de Estudios de las Finanzas Públicas, Cámara de Diputados, México. 
 
As Table 6 shows, the assumption of equal variances over the full period is not 
rejected during the periods 1981:01-1990:04 and 1991:01-1998:04, but it is rejected 
for the period 1999:01-2007:04. During the period 1999-2007 the volatility of the 
Mexican output was significantly lower than in the preceding years. Therefore, in 
this period there is a relationship between the low volatilities of output and inflation 
and the implementation of the IT, a conclusion in line with the postulates of this 
monetary strategy. In the case of the figures of the rates of economic growth, how-
ever, the hypothesis of equality of means is not rejected in any sub-period, involving 
that the lower inflation rates and higher price stability has not significantly affected 
the rates of economic growth.  
Therefore, the better inflation performance has not led to a better economic 
growth outcome. That is, IT may have contributed to stabilize inflation at low rates, 
but it has not led to higher economic growth. Although the object of this paper is not 
to explain this outcome, we want to point out that it could be related to the behavior 
of the Mexican peso exchange rate and its relationship with the monetary policy
3. 
The reason is that the impact of the changes in the exchange rate of the Mexican peso 
on economic activity is not symmetric. Thus, when monetary policy relaxes and the 
Mexican interest rate fall, leading to a depreciation of the exchange rate of the peso 
the positive effects on economic growth are limited, smaller than those registered in 
other economies like Brazil (Cuevas Ahumada 2009). The reason would be that the 
main determinant of Mexican exports is not their price but the USA demand of 
Mexican exports. But when Banxico raises the interest rates the appreciation of the 
peso has a negative impact on Mexican net exports (Galindo and Ros 2006, 2008). 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
After the debt crisis in 1982, Mexico started a process of adjustments and reforms 
that led to implement an export-led growth strategy. A key institutional and policy 
element of this strategy was the reform of the Banco de Mexico that increased the 
autonomy of the institution, the setting of an inflation target and the freedom to 
choose the policy tools. After the loss of credibility due to the Tequila crisis in 1995, 
and following the worldwide trends in monetary policy and central banking, Banxico 
decided to adopt inflation targeting as its monetary strategy. 
According to our findings, both the level and volatility of inflation had begun 
to fall before the introduction of IT and Full-Fledged Inflation Targeting. Moreover, 
                                                        
3 See Stone et al. (2009) for a deep analysis of the role of the exchange rate in IT emerging economies.  
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since 1997, again before the implementation of IT, a convergence process of Mexi-
can inflation to USA inflation is also detected. Regarding the impact of IT and FFIT 
on economic activity, during the targeting period there is no significant change in the 
rates of economic growth, although we detect a lower volatility of the economic 
growth; in sum, the economic growth has not been affected, although it is more sta-
ble than in the past. 
In sum, the improvements in terms of lower and more stable inflation in Mex-
ico cannot be solely (or mainly) attributed to the adoption of IT. This does not in-
volve, mean, that the IT strategy has had no impact. The recent unparalleled stability 
of the low Mexican inflation might well be influenced by the IT, and this would have 
been the main contribution of this monetary strategy: the anchoring of inflation ex-
pectations to the inflation target. 
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